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The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the
full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such
renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question,
we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service
contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types
of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over
time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commit-
ment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant
but would accrue mostly to operators.
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Real world regulatory relationships are ongoing processes in changing environ-
ments. Parties lay down arrangements for trading goods and services covering several
periods. However they often recontract as new information on market demand and
costs structure becomes available. Although economic theory has devoted consider-
able attention to understanding dynamic contractual relationships and especially how
contracts are renegotiated over time, the empirical literature on those issues lags much
behind both in terms of volume and scope.
Is is by now well-known that renegotiation imposes various transaction costs on
contracting. Although renegotiation improves contracting ex post, it has also perverse
effects on the contractual parties’ ex ante incentives.1 Overall, those costs prevent con-
tracting parties from achieving the informationally constrained efficient solution that
could have been reached under full commitment. However, an open issue from an
empirical viewpoint remains to assess the welfare losses associated with such renego-
tiation. Furthermore, another important question is to understand how those losses
are distributed between contracting parties.
Making progresses on this front is crucial, especially for practitioners who are eager
to evaluate the performances of various contractual arrangements found in their real-
world practices. In this respect, the French urban transportation sector offers a partic-
ularly attractive field for study. Motivated by a concern for improving ex ante compe-
tition among potential operators, the 1993 Transportation Law imposed that franchise
contracts must be re-auctioned and “re-negotiated” every 5 years by public authorities
in charge of regulating the service. Since then, practitioners in the industry have re-
peatedly complained that this institutional constraint on contract duration is too tight.
Expectations that welfare gains could be achieved by increasing contract duration is at
the source of an ongoing political debate and some political activism by operators.
Motivation. This paper has two main objectives. First, we construct and estimate a
structural principal-agent model of contract renegotiation in the French urban trans-
port sector. A basic assumption of this model is that contracting takes place under
1Such perverse incentives arise in at least three occasions. First, information may be incorporated in
contract design only at a slow pace as in the literature on adverse-selection under imperfect commit-
ment (Dewatripont, 1989, Hart and Tirole, 1988, Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Chapter 10, Rey and Salanie´,
1996, Laffont and Martimort, 2002, Chapter 9, among others). Second, the threat of regulatory hold-up
may impede specific investments which requires costly governance and various safeguards (Williamson,
1985). Finally optimal risk-sharing arrangements may be disrupted (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990). Only
the first of these impediments to contracting will be investigated in this paper.
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asymmetric information: operators are privately informed on their innate costs at the
time of contracting with public authorities. Second, we use those estimates to recover
not only the welfare gains but also their distribution if full commitment were feasible.
These gains are significant although unevenly distributed: operators are net winners
when the length of the contract is extended whereas taxpayers/consumers lose.
Our model accounts for an important feature of the industry. In practice, only two
kinds of contracts are used by local public authorities (principals) to regulate the ser-
vice: cost-plus and fixed-price contracts. It is well-known from the works of Laffont
and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1), Rogerson (1987), Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992) and Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001) that menus of linear contracts might
facilitate self-selection of operators according to innate costs.2 Of much importance
from a practical point of view, such menus approximate quite well the optimal con-
tract and are sometimes even able to achieve what more complex nonlinear contracts
would do.3 In that respect, Rogerson (2003) pointed out that, in most real-world pro-
curement contexts, a menu with only two items (cost-plus/fixed-price) may actually
suffice to achieve much of the gains from trade, even under asymmetric information.4
A second important feature of the urban transportation sector is that subsidies (or
“compensations” as they are often referred to by practitioners) proposed to operators
increase over time no matter the characteristics of the service. Our theoretical model
provides a rationale for such patterns. Increasing subsidies result from the local au-
thorities’ limited ability to commit and the fact that information on the operator’s cost
structure gets revealed over time. This point is familiar from the agency literature on
limited commitment.5 However, it is revisited here in a specific institutional context
where two-item menus (fixed-price/cost-plus) are the only feasible contracts. Whereas
2In addition, linear contracts also have nice robustness properties under cost uncertainty (Laffont
and Tirole 1993, Chapter 1, p.109, and Caillaud, Guesnerie and Rey, 1992).
3Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) showed that the optimal nonlinear cost reimbursement rule can
be implemented with a menu of linear contracts when this nonlinear contract is convex. Wilson (1993)
and McAfee (2002) demonstrated that such menus might already fare well with only a few items.
4More specifically, Rogerson (2003) supposed that the firm’s innate cost which is its private informa-
tion is uniformly distributed and showed that this simple menu can secure three-fourth of the surplus
that an optimal contract would achieve. Chu and Sappington (2007) challenged this result beyond the
case of a uniform distribution. On a related note, Schmalensee (1989), Reichelstein (1992), Bower (1993),
and Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey (1999) investigated the value of relying on a single linear contract and
concluded also on the good welfare performances achieved with such a rough contract design.
5Dewatripont (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10) and Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter
9) among others.
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the existing theoretical literature on limited commitment has focused on discrete type
models to derive fully optimal renegotiation-proof contracts but is often criticized for
its lack of tractability, our model imports much of the tractability of Rogerson (2003)’s
model into a dynamic framework where contracts are renegotiated over time.6 So do-
ing, we look for a theoretical modeling consistent with our data set. Considering a
continuum of types is indeed a prerequisite for evaluating a meaningful distribution
of cost parameters in our empirical model. This allows us to neatly characterize the
probabilities of various contractual regimes (cost-plus, fixed-price, and changes over
time between those two options). This is an important preliminary step for our estima-
tion procedure based on a maximum likelihood criterion.
Empirical analysis. Turning to the empirical part of our study, we provide a structural
estimation of the model parameters under a scenario assuming that renegotiation is
a concern for the parties. To understand the estimation bias that would arise had we
wrongly assumed full commitment, it is useful to come back on the basic intuition
underlying the trade-off between ex post efficiency and ex ante incentives that appears
under renegotiation. To be acceptable, renegotiation must raise subsidies so that even
operators which are only mildly efficient may end up choosing fixed-price contracts.
Those efficiency gains give also more rents to the most efficient operators who enjoy
such increased subsidies. From a welfare point of view, renegotiation is thus more at-
tractive when the social value of the operators’ effort in cutting costs is greater. Only
in that case, the efficiency gains from renegotiation dominate its costs in terms of ex-
tra rents. Wrongly assuming full commitment when analyzing our data would thus
amount to underestimate the social value of effort and overestimate information rents.
Our empirical analysis also provide estimate of the congruence of objectives be-
tween the operator and the local government in charge of regulating the service. The
weight of the operator’s profit in the regulator’s objective depends on the political
color. Right-wing municipalities are more prone to favor private operators than left-
wing ones.7
Finally, using our estimates of the operator’s innate cost distributions and other
6Rogerson (2003)’s analysis is static and thus cannot cover the rich dynamic patterns observed in
our data set, in particular the steady increase in subsidies over time and the move towards fixed-price
contracts as time passes.
7Kalt and Zupan (1984, 1990) provided evidence on the fact that policymakers’ ideology may have a
significant impact on regulatory outcome.
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parameters of the model, we evaluate the welfare gains that would be obtained when
moving to the full commitment solution. The intertemporal subsidies under full com-
mitment are higher than under renegotiation, so that taxpayers are the net losers from a
hypothetical increase in the contract length. However, the welfare gains are significant.
Taxpayers bear an increase in tax burden of 8 million Euros whereas operators see their
expected information rent increase by roughly 8.2 million Euros. This result justifies
the operators’ political activism in pushing for an increase in contract duration.
Literature review. Our model belongs to the recent empirical literature on regulatory
contracts. First, as already explained, this paper contributes to the ongoing empirical
debate on the value of using simple menus of contracts. In a pioneering paper, Wolak
(1994) estimated the production function of a Californian water utility, and argued that
regulatory mechanisms a` la Baron and Myerson (1982) are used. Assuming instead
that costs are observable as in Laffont and Tirole (1993), Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey
(1997), Brocas, Chan and Perrigne (2006) and Perrigne and Vuong (2007) considered
complex regulatory schemes to estimate costs and demand parameters of structural
models. Other empirical studies argue instead that such complex mechanisms might
not be so useful. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) focused on the private construction industry
in the U.S. and noticed that most contracts are either cost-plus or fixed-price. The rea-
son for such restricted menus is that public authorities look for an appropriate trade-
off between providing ex ante incentives with fixed-price contracts and avoiding ex post
transaction costs due to costly renegotiation with cost-plus arrangements. Considering
contracts in the automobile insurance industry, Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) restricted
the analysis to menus with only two types of coverage. In the field of transportation,
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) focused on the incentive effects of cost-plus and fixed-
price contracts. They measured actual welfare related to real regulatory practices, and
compared this measure to what would have been achieved with more complex mech-
anisms. We improve upon Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) by modeling contract design
and giving more attention to the dynamics of contracts.
In that respect, our paper is also related to Dionne and Doherty (1994). They fo-
cused on the car insurance industry in California and suggested that insurers may use
long-term contracts as a device to enhance efficiency and attract portfolios of domi-
nantly low-risk drivers. Our empirical analysis shows the extent to which long-term
contracts may benefit not only principals (hereafter public authorities) but also their
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agents (operators).
Organization of the paper. Section 1 gives an overview of the French urban transportation
sector. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and solves for the optimal menu of
contracts (fixed-prices/cost-plus) both under full commitment and renegotiation. We
derive the important property that subsidies increase over time when renegotiation
matters. Section 3 develops our empirical method. Section 4 evaluates the magnitude
of the welfare gains when moving to full commitment and their distribution between
operators and taxpayers. Section 5 highlights alleys for further research.8
1 The French Urban Transportation Industry
As in most countries around the world, urban transportation in France is a regulated
activity. Local transportation networks cover each urban area of significant size. For
each network, a local authority (a city, a group of cities or a district) contracts with a
single operator to provide the service. Regulatory rules prevent the presence of several
suppliers of transportation services on the same urban network. A distinguishing fea-
ture of France compared to most other OECD countries is that about eighty percent of
local operators are private and are owned by three large companies, two of them being
private while the third one is semi-public.9 In 2002, these companies, with their re-
spective ownership structures and market shares (in terms of number of networks op-
erated) were KEOLIS (private, 30%), TRANSDEV (semi-public, 19%), CONNEX (pri-
vate, 25%). In addition there are a small private group, AGIR, and a few public firms
under the control of local governments.
1.1 Economic Environment
The 1982 Transportation Law was enacted to facilitate decentralized decision-making
on urban transportation and to provide guidelines for regulation. As a result, each
local authority now organizes its own transportation system by setting route and fare
structures, capacity, quality of service, conditions for subsidizing the service, levels of
8Proofs of the theoretical model are provided in an Appendix.
9For an overview of the regulation of urban transportation systems in the different countries of the
European Union, the United States and Japan, see IDEI (1999).
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investment and ownership nature. The local authority may operate the network di-
rectly or it may delegate that task to an operator. In this case, a formal contract defines
the regulatory rules that the operator must follow as well as a cost-reimbursement
scheme.
Since 1993, “beauty contests” are required to allocate the building and manage-
ment of new infrastructures for urban transportation when the date for contract re-
newal comes. However, and until recently, very few networks have changed operators
from one regulatory period to the other. Documentary investigations shed light on the
fact that awarding transport operations through tenders does not necessarily foster ex
ante competition since most local authorities usually receive bids from only one firm,
namely the operator already in charge. Several reasons might explain this phenom-
enon. First, local authorities are either reluctant to implement the law or do not have
enough expertise to launch complex calls for tender. Second, the three groups owning
most of the urban operators in France are located on specific geographical areas which
restricts competition. Finally, these groups also operate other municipal services such
as water distribution or garbage collection, which makes it even harder for public au-
thorities to credibly punish operators following bad performances.
In most urban areas, operating costs are on average twice as high as commercial
revenues. Budgets are rarely balanced without subsidies. One reason is that operators
face universal service obligations and must operate in low demand areas. Low prices
are maintained to ensure affordable access to all consumers of public transportation.
Moreover, special fares are given to targeted groups like seniors and students. Subsi-
dies come from the State’s budget, the local authority’s budget, and a special tax paid
by local firms (employing more than nine full-time workers).
Undertaking a welfare analysis of regulatory schemes requires a database that en-
compasses both the performance and the organization of the French urban transport
industry. The basic idea is to consider each system in an urban area during a time pe-
riod as a realization of a regulatory contract. Such a database was created in the early
1980s from an annual survey conducted by the Centre d’Etude et de Recherche du Trans-
port Urbain (CERTU, Lyon) with the support of the Groupement des Autorite´s Respon-
sables du Transport (GART, Paris), a nationwide trade organization that gathers most
of the local authorities in charge of a urban transport network. In France, this rich
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source is a unique tool for comparing regulatory systems both across space and over
time. For our study and for homogeneity purposes, we have selected all urban areas of
more than 100,000 inhabitants. Indeed, smaller cities may entail service and network
characteristics that differ significantly from those in bigger urban areas. Discarding
these smaller cities allows us to identify in a more satisfactory manner differences in
inefficiencies and cost-reducing activities across operators. The sample does not in-
clude the largest networks of France, i.e., Paris, Lyon and Marseille, as they are not
covered by the survey. Overall, the panel data set covers 49 different urban transport
networks over the period 1987-2001. Note finally that we focus only on transport net-
works where the operator is not public. This rules out the so-called Regies municipales
where the service is provided by a public entity (this is mostly the case in large cities
such as Paris, Lyon and Marseille). We may indeed expect that those cases are less
concerned with the principal-agent problem at the heart of our investigation.
We assume that the network operator has private information about its innate tech-
nology (adverse selection) and that its cost-reducing effort is non-observable (moral
hazard). Because French local authorities exercise their new powers on transportation
policy since the enactment of the 1982 Law only, and since they usually face serious fi-
nancial difficulties, their limited auditing capacities is recognized among practitioners.
A powerful and well-performed audit system needs effort, time and money. French ex-
perts on urban transportation blame local authorities for being too lax in assessing op-
erating costs, mainly because of a lack of knowledge of the technology.10 The number
of buses required for a specific network, the costs incurred on each route, the fuel con-
sumption of buses (which is highly dependent on drivers’ skills), the drivers’ behavior
toward customers, the effect of traffic congestion on costs, are all aspects for which
operators have much more data and a better understanding than public authorities.
This suggests the presence of adverse selection on innate technology in the first place.
Given the technical complexity of these issues, it should be even harder for the local
authority to assess whether and to what extent operators undertake efforts to provide
appropriate and efficient management. Moral hazard arises quite naturally on top of
the adverse selection problem. When compounded, those informational asymmetries
10The French urban transport expert O. Domenach has argued that “the regulator is not able of determin-
ing the number of buses which is necessary to run the network. The same comment can be made regarding the
fuel consumption of each bus. The regulators are generally general practitioners instead of transport professionals.
Hence, the (re)negotiation of contracts between regulators and operators is not fair.” See Domenach (1987).
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play a crucial role in the design of contractual arrangements and financial objectives.11
Before turning to the description of the contracts, three additional remarks should
be made. First, private information on demand is not a relevant issue in our industry.
Local governments are well informed about the transportation needs of citizens. The
number of trips performed over a certain period is easily observed, and the regulator
has a very precise idea of how the socio-demographic characteristics of a urban area
fluctuate over time. Given the level of demand, the regulator sets the service capacity
provided by the operator. Second, we do not address the issue of determining what
should be the optimal rate-of-return on capital. The rolling stock is owned by the local
government for a vast majority of networks. In this case, the regulator is responsible for
renewing the vehicles, as well as guaranteeing a certain level of capital quality. Finally,
we rule out the possibility of risk sharing in the contractual relationships between the
operators and the regulators since the provision of transport services does not entail
unpredictable cost fluctuations for the operators. Uncertainty on costs and demand is
potentially relevant in small networks but, as suggested above, we focus only on big
networks, i.e., those above 100,000 inhabitants.
1.2 Regulatory Contracts
Several features of the regulatory contracts are worth emphasizing. As already men-
tioned, two types of regulatory contracts are implemented in the French urban trans-
port industry. Fixed-price regimes are high-powered incentive schemes, while cost-
plus regimes do not provide any incentives for cost reduction. Over the period of
observation, fixed-price contracts are employed in 55.5% of the cases.
On average, contracts are signed for a period of 5 to 6 years, which in most cases
allows us to observe several regulatory arrangements for the same network. Over-
all, we observe 136 different contracts and 94 are given from their starting point. In
the same network, the regulatory scheme may switch from cost-plus to fixed-price or
from fixed-price to cost-plus between two regulatory periods. We observe 20 changes
of regulatory regimes, most of them (i.e., 17) being switches from cost-plus to fixed-
price regimes. These changes occur because the same local authority may be willing
11Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) confirmed through a test that adverse selection and moral hazard are
two important features of the industry. They showed that a regulatory framework which encompasses
these two ingredients performs well to explain data.
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to change regulatory rules, or because a new government is elected and changes the
established rules. Note however that a change in the political color of the local govern-
ment does not necessarily imply an early renegotiation of the contract before its term.
New local governments are indeed committed to the contracts signed by their prede-
cessors. We detect 22 changes of local governments in our database. Finally, as already
suggested, very few changes of operators are observed over our period of observation.
Indeed, only 2 new operators proposed services between 1987 and 2001.
An important feature of the industry is that the volume of subsidies paid to the
operator under a fixed-price regime depends on the contractual arrangement from
one period to another. Subsidies are higher for fixed-price regimes when a cost-plus
scheme is implemented in the previous period, compared to subsidies paid if a series
of fixed-price schemes is enforced. To establish that this feature is present in the data,
we run a simple regression of the log subsidy paid on a set of covariates, which are
the log number of vehicles in the operator’s rolling stock, the log size of the transport
network in kilometers, whether the observed regulator is right-wing or not, whether
the observed fixed-price contract is implemented after a cost-plus regime or not, and
a set of firms fixed effects.12 The CF dummy indicating that the observed fixed-price
regime is implemented after a cost-plus scheme is positive and significant at the 1%
level. On average, subsidies paid under fixed-price after a cost-plus are 40.9% higher
than those given to the operator operated under a series of fixed-price regimes. We
will show that this important feature can be rationalized in a dynamic setting where
regulators increase subsidies over time to give mildly efficient operators incentives to
choose fixed-price instead of cost-plus contracts.
2 Theoretical Model
Our theoretical model takes into account the various features of the French urban trans-
port industry stressed above and adapts the lessons of the contracting literature under
imperfect commitment accordingly. First, operators choose between either a fixed-
price or a cost-plus contract. Second, contracts entail increasing subsidies over time.
We will argue below that such patterns arise when contracts are “renegotiation-proof.”
12Estimation results are (392 observations, firms’ fixed effects included, standard errors in parenthe-
sis): log Subsidy = 4.87
(0.26)
+ 0.68
(0.05)
log Rolling Stock + 0.23
(0.03)
log network − 0.11
(0.03)
Right-Wing + 0.34
(0.09)
CF.
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This positive model is then compared to an hypothetical setting where regulators could
commit but optimal subsidies would then remain constant over time.
Consider a local authority (the “principal”). Generalizing the objective functions
used in Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1993), the preferences of
this principal are defined as:
W = S − (1 + λ)t(c) + αU where α < 1 + λ and λ > 0
where S is the gross surplus generated by the service.13
The local government’s payment to the firm (the “agent”) depends on whether
fixed-price or cost-plus contracts are used. For a fixed-price contract, the principal
offers a fixed payment t(c) ≡ b for any realized cost c. With a cost-plus contract, the
principal reimburses the firm’s cost c and t(c) ≡ c for all c. Raising subsidies from the
local budget with distortionary taxation entails some dead-weight loss that is captured
by introducing a positive cost of public funds λ > 0.
Local public authorities might differ in terms of the weights they give to the op-
erator’s profit U in their objective functions. To have a meaningful trade-off between
the dual objectives of extracting the contractor’s information rent and inducing effi-
cient cost-reducing effort, we assume that α < 1 + λ so that, overall, one extra euro
left to the firm is socially costly. Various motivations might justify such preferences
of local governments. The parameter α might for instance capture the firm’s bargain-
ing power at the time of awarding franchises and as such reflect the level of ex ante
competition among potential operators.14,15 In view of our empirical study, we may
also distinguish local governments according to their political preferences. We define
rightist (resp. leftist) local governments as those which commend more (resp. less) rent
for the private operator. This corresponds to higher values of α.16
13Implicitly, we consider a setting where the elasticity of demand is small even in the long-run which
seems a reasonable assumption in the case of transportation. See Oum et al. (1992).
14In this sector, ex ante competition is not so fierce. Indeed, different operators mostly avoid head-
to-head competition and generally make tenders for markets in distinct urban areas. The decision n0
05-D-38 of the French Conseil de la Concurrence shows that competition authorities are well-aware of this
downstream collusion between potential operators. In more than 60 % of cases, there is indeed only a
single bidder. This potential horizontal collusion is captured in ad hoc way in our framework through
the parameter α. The benefit of such ad hoc specification of the intensity of potential downstream com-
petition is to fit real-world practices while it fortunately eases the analysis of the contractual dynamics.
15Following the insights of Baron (1989), Laffont (1996) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003),
these preferences might also result from a political equilibrium among various forces at the local level.
16Laffont (1996) developed related political economy models of regulation relying on such arguments.
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Turning to the cost structure, we follow Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1) and
Rogerson (2003) in considering that the observable cost of one unit of the service c
blends together an adverse selection component θ, the innate efficiency of the service,
and a cost-reducing managerial effort e. We postulate the standard functional form:
c = θ − e.
Effort is costly for the firm’s management and the corresponding non-monetary disu-
tility function ψ(e) is increasing and convex (ψ′ ≥ 0, ψ′′ > 0) with ψ(0) = 0. The
intrinsic efficiency parameter θ is drawn once and for all before contracting from the
interval [θ, θ¯] according to the common knowledge cumulative distribution F (·) which
has an everywhere positive and atomless density f(·). Following the screening liter-
ature, we assume that the monotone hazard rate property holds, d
dθ
(R(θ)) > 0 where
R(θ) = F (θ)
f(θ)
so that all optimization problems considered below are quasi-concave.17
With those notations in hand, we may as well write the firm’s profit as:
U = t(c)− c− ψ(e)
where t(c) is the payment received from the public authority.
2.1 Full Commitment
In this section, we assume that the local government offers a long-term contract which
covers two contracting periods and he has all bargaining power at the contracting
stage. The principal can commit to any pattern of subsidies and cost reimbursement
rules over time and can reach thereby the highest possible intertemporal payoff. This
gives us an attractive benchmark against which to assess the alternative model with
limited commitment and renegotiation. This benchmark is also useful when we move
to our empirical analysis and evaluate the costs of renegotiation.
Let δ be the discount factor and let us normalize the length of the first-period ac-
counting period so that first-period welfare and profits receive the weight β = 1
1+δ
when computing net present values of those quantities.
17For the sake of our empirical analysis, it is worth noticing that the same operator could have differ-
ent realizations of its innate cost on two different markets. This assumption captures the fact that costs
on a given network are to a large extent idiosyncratic.
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Consider first the case of a long-term fixed-price contract. Such a contract entails
subsidies (b1, b2) over both periods. In period i, the regulatory payment is thus ti(c) =
bi. With such a fixed-price contract, the principal is able to pass onto the operator
all incentives to save on costs. Let e∗ be the corresponding first-best effort such that
ψ′(e∗) = 1, and denote by k = e∗−ψ(e∗) its social value. This long-term contract yields
to the firm the (normalized) intertemporal payoff
βb1 + (1− β)b2 − θ + k.
Instead, with a cost-plus contract covering both periods, the operator is reimbursed
for his costs so that he exerts no effort and his payoff is zero.18
Only the most efficient operators such that θ ≤ θ∗ choose fixed-price contracts. By
incentive compatibility, if any given type prefers a fixed-price contract, more efficient
types also do so. The types interval is thus split into two subsets. Efficient operators
take fixed-price contracts whereas inefficient ones are on cost-plus. The marginal oper-
ator with type θ∗ is just indifferent between choosing cost-plus or fixed-price long-term
contracts where θ∗ satisfies:
θ∗ = βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k.
Efficient operators such that θ ≤ θ∗ earn an information rent worth θ∗ − θ whereas
inefficient operators such that θ ≥ θ∗ earn no such rent.19
Although the public authority offers a menu of two possible long-term contracts
with either fixed-price or cost-plus over both periods, the operator only selects one
item within this menu. From an empirical point of view, the econometrician is only able
to observe the choice made by operators, i.e., a single item (either long-term fixed-price
or cost-plus) and not the specific negotiation process that leads to this choice. Details
of the negotiation remain unknown. Following the mechanism design tradition, this
process is captured in our theoretical model by having principals offering not a single
offer but instead menus among which operators with different types self-select.
18The operator focuses on cost-reducing effort only and is not responsible for improving the quality
of the service. Quality entails various dimensions such as the size of the network, the number and size
of lines, the number of stops, the frequency of the service, and the age of the rolling stock which are
indeed observable and regulated by contract.
19The operator’s choice between taking either a long-term fixed price contract or a cost-plus one re-
veals information on his type. After this choice becomes publicly known, the public authority can assess
whether that type is above the threshold θ∗ or not. Under full commitment, the public authority does
not use such information to refine contractual offers in the future since no such offer is ever made.
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The optimal subsidies under full commitment are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Under full commitment, the optimal fixed-price contract is the twice-repeated
version of the static optimal one. It entails a subsidy bF which is constant over time bF1 = bF2 =
bF and satisfies:
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
R(bF + k). (1)
The most efficient firms with types θ ≤ θF = bF + k choose this long-term fixed-price contract.
The least efficient firms with types θ ≥ θF = bF + k operate under a cost-plus contract for both
periods.
The optimal menu of contracts trades off efficiency and rent extraction. Offering a
fixed-price with a sufficiently large subsidy to all types would indeed ensure that the
operator exerts the first-best effort whatever its innate technology. However, doing so
also leaves too much information rent to the operator and it is socially costly. Offering
instead only a cost-plus contract nullifies this rent but it also destroys incentives to
exert effort.
Under full commitment, the optimal contract is the twice-repeated version of the
optimal static contract: a by-now standard result in the dynamic contracting litera-
ture.20 Given that the economic environment is stationary, the trade-off between rent
extraction and efficiency remains the same in both periods. Hence, there is no reason
to move from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract over time. This justifies our initial
focus on the binary choice between a long-term fixed-price and a long-term cost-plus
contract and explains why we did not consider more complex patterns with cost-plus
contracts followed by fixed-prices for instance. Such profiles are suboptimal under full
commitment although they will be attractive under limited commitment.
The intuition behind condition (1) is as follows. Suppose that the principal offers a
fixed subsidy b in both period. By raising this subsidy by db, the principal ensures that
with probability f(b+k)db, a firm with type in the interval [b+k, b+k+db]will now exert
effort e∗ in both periods. This yields an expected social benefit (1+λ)kf(b+k)db. On the
other hand, raising the subsidy entails a budgetary cost worth (1 + λ)F (b + k)db since
even firms with infra-marginal types enjoy such higher subsidies. This nevertheless
also raises the social value of the rent left to the most efficient firms by a quantity
20See Baron and Besanko (1984) and Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 8).
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αF (b + k)db. Finally, an optimal subsidy bF trades off the expected efficiency gains
with the net cost of increasing information rent and solves:
(1 + λ)kf(bF + k)db+ αF (bF + k)db = (1 + λ)F (bF + k)db.
Simplifying yields (1).
The optimal subsidy bF increases with k and α. Intuitively, when effort has a greater
social value or when the operator’s rent has more weight in the public authority’s
objectives, the optimal subsidy under a fixed-price contract must be raised to induce
more firms to operate under higher powered incentives which commands more rent.
2.2 Renegotiation
Overview and modeling choices. The full commitment assumption used in Section
2.1 does not represent real-world practices as we explained above. Although the 1993
Law invites local authorities to re-auction concession contracts for a fixed period of 5
years, these authorities are either reluctant to really implement the law or do not have
enough expertise to launch complex calls for tenders. In practice, local authorities con-
sider the requirement of re-auctioning the contract at fixed dates as the opportunity
to renegotiate a contract with the incumbent (the so-called “ope´rateur historique”) in-
stead of really envisioning the possibility to contract with a new operator.
Theory has distinguished between two kinds of paradigms when it comes to model
intertemporal contracting under limited commitment. The first concept allows for
long-term contracts which can be renegotiated if parties find it mutually attractive.21
The second paradigm considers instead short-term contracts; only spot contracts for
the current period can be enforced.22 Although contracts in the French transportation
sector have a limited duration, the second of these paradigms does not capture the kind
of relational contracting that characterizes a long-lived relationship between a local au-
thority and its “ope´rateur historique”. The first paradigm better fits evidence, although
it must be adapted to take into account that, even though a long-term contract cannot
be signed, the promise of future rounds of contracting between the public authority
21Dewatripont (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10), Hart and Tirole (1988) and Rey and
Salanie´ (1996) in adverse selection contexts.
22Guesnerie, Freixas and Tirole (1985) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 9) among others.
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and the incumbent is sufficiently credible. In other words, although no long-term con-
tracts really bind parties together, everything happens as if the public authority could
credibly commit to promises for further rounds of contracting. The renegotiation par-
adigm can then be replaced by a “re-negotiation” view of contracting that, although
technically similar, captures somewhat different real-world practices.
As soon as the local authority suffers from imperfect information on the operator’s
type, the selection of a contract within the simple two-item menu at the early con-
tracting stage reveals information on the firm’s type. Choosing a fixed-price contract
is interpreted by the principal as being “good news” since it signals that the firm’s
innate efficiency parameter θ is low enough. Instead, choosing a cost-plus contract
brings “bad news.” In a dynamic environment, information on costs is revealed over
time and the principal would like to draft new agreements that incorporate such in-
formation. In particular, an increase over time in the subsidies specified in fixed-price
contracts allows operators who have revealed themselves as being not very efficient
earlier on to achieve productivity gains later on. Such greater subsidies might thus
be viewed as ex post attractive from the principal’s viewpoint. However, these ex post
efficiency gains also come with ex ante costs because the most efficient firms may only
move to fixed-price contracts later on to pocket greater subsidies. Overall, renegotia-
tion is costly from the principal’s viewpoint. This important dynamic trade-off and its
impact on information revelation are at the core of our model.
Menus of contracts. To fit with patterns of contracting found in our data set, we al-
low the principal to make an initial offer entailing a whole menu of options: A long-
term fixed-price contract, a first-period cost-plus contract followed by a second-period
fixed-price and a long-term cost-plus contract.
Let respectively index by j = G, I,B, the three following different histories. First,
the agent may choose the long-term fixed-price contract C01 which is “good news” on
his type. Second, the agent may choose the fixed-price contract for the second-period
only C02 which is “intermediate news”. Finally, the agent may choose the long-term
cost-plus contract C03 with no subsidies in either period which is “bad news”.
Operators with different types might choose different options. We will look for an
equilibrium where the most efficient types that belong to an interval ΘG follows history
G, whereas intermediate and least efficient ones that belong respectively to the interval
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ΘI and ΘB follow respectively histories I and B.
Denote by C01 = (b1, b02) the subsidies under a long-term fixed-price contract, and
by C02 = (θ, b03) those subsidies if a fixed-price contract is only taken at date 2 whereas
a cost-plus contract is used at date 1 (taking into account that effort is then zero at this
date). Let C03 = (θ, θ) denote a long-term cost-plus contract which reimburses costs in
each period but induces no effort. Let also define by C0 = (b1, b02, b03) the overall menu
of subsidies offered at the initial contracting stage. Let finally denote by R0 = (b02, b03)
the continuation of C0 for date 2.
Timing. Let us describe the timing of the contracting game.
• Date 0: The firm learns its efficiency parameter θ.
• Date 0.25: The principal commits to a menu (C01 , C02 , C03) ≡ C0 = (b1, b02, b03).
• Date 0.50: The firm makes its choice among those three possible options. The princi-
pal updates his beliefs on the firm’s innate cost following that choice.
• Date 1.00: First-period costs are realized and payments are made according to the
contract enforced at that date.
• Date 1.25: If he wishes so, the principal makes a renegotiated offer corresponding
to a new subsidy. Depending on whether the firm has already accepted C01 or made
another choice (i.e., either C02 or C03 ), the renegotiated subsidies following each of those
paths are respectively denoted by b˜2 or b˜3.
• Date 1.50: The firm chooses whether to accept this new offer or not and chooses
his second-period effort accordingly. If the offer is refused, the initial contract C0i (be
it a fixed-price or a cost-plus for the second-period) is enforced. Otherwise the new
renegotiated offer supersedes the initial contract.
• Date 2: Second-period costs are realized and payments are made.
Let denote R˜ = (C˜2, C˜3) ≡ (b˜2, b˜3) any profile of subsidies offered at the renegotia-
tion stage following an initial offer C0.23 A profile of renegotiated offers R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) is
accepted at the renegotiation stage, if subsidies satisfy the following constraints:
b˜2 ≥ b02 and b˜3 ≥ b03. (2)
23We omit the dependence of R˜ on C0 for notational simplicity.
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The first inequality in (2) stipulates that types in ΘG can always refuse any renegotiated
offer following history j = G if it does not increase the second-period subsidy above
b02 and thus their payoff. The second inequality is similar for types in ΘI .
Equilibrium concept. An almost perfect Bayesian equilibrium (in short equilibrium) of
the contractual game consists of the following strategies and beliefs:
• Principal’s strategy. The principal offers the menu C0 at date 1, but might propose
a renegotiation R˜ at date 2. This second-period offer is made once the principal has
already updated his beliefs over the firm’s type following its first-period decision.
• Firm’s strategy. The firm anticipates (perfectly in equilibrium) what the second pe-
riod subsidies are following renegotiation. Let denote those anticipated subsidies by
R = (b2, b3).
The firm follows a cut-off strategy that yields the following contracting pattern.
1. Types in ΘG =
[
θ, b1 + k +
1−β
β
(b2 − b3)
]
adopt already contract C01 anticipating
that b02 and b03 will be respectively renegotiated to b2 and b3. The cut-off type
θ∗1 = b1+k+
1−β
β
(b2−b3) is just indifferent between choosing fixed-price contracts
in each period with subsidies (b1, b2) and moving from a cost-plus contract to a
fixed-price with subsidy b3 in the second period.
2. Types in ΘI = [b1 + k + 1−ββ (b2 − b3), b3 + k] choose contract C02 with the same
expectations than above. The cut-off type θ∗2 = b3 + k is just indifferent between
moving from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract with subsidy b3 and taking a
cost-plus contract over both periods.
3. Types in ΘB = [b3 + k, θ¯] choose contract C03 anticipating the renegotiated fixed-
price offer won’t be attractive for them anyway.
This pattern summarizes incentive compatibility in this dynamic environment. For
instance, if the cut-off type θ∗1 is just indifferent between adopting subsidies in both
periods or only at date 2, more efficient types θ ≤ θ∗1 certainly also prefer subsidies in
both periods. Those types reveal that they belong to the interval ΘG.
“Almost” equilibrium and limited updating. Note that the principal only updates
his beliefs at date 0.50 before making a renegotiation offer. This is a slight departure
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of full rationality to the extent that the principal should have updated his beliefs with
the more precise information obtained from observing first-period costs if the firm had
chosen a cost-plus contract for that period and has indeed been reimbursed for those
costs. This justifies the use of the qualifier “almost” for our notion of equilibrium.24
Renegotiation-Proofness Principle. The theoretical literature on renegotiation has
shown that focusing on renegotiation-proof mechanisms which come unchanged through
the renegotiation process is without loss of generality.25 The intuition is as follows. Any
long-term contract which is renegotiated in the second period of the relationship could
be replaced by a long-term contract with a continuation for the second period which
is equal to this renegotiated offer. This second-period offer is not itself superseded by
any new contract for the second period because, otherwise, it would contradict the op-
timality of the renegotiated offer in the first place. Our focus on renegotiation-proof
profiles follows the same logic and is without loss of generality as we now show.
Proposition 2 There is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to contracts of the form
C = (b1, R) that come unchanged through the renegotiation process, i.e., such that R = (b2, b3)
maximizes the principal’s second period welfare subject to the following acceptance condition
b˜2 ≥ b2 and b˜3 ≥ b3. (3)
24Let instead assume that the principal is fully rational and updates his beliefs following any possible
realization of first-period cost. Inefficient firms under a cost-plus in the first period would certainly not
fully reveal their type at this stage and, anticipating future renegotiation, might claim having the worst
possible first-period cost c1 = θ¯. This strategy increases the firm’s information rent for the first period
and it also hides valuable information away from the fully rational principal in view of second-period
contracting. Suppose instead that a firm with innate cost θ adopts a more naive first-period behavior
and reveals its type not anticipating the subsequent use of that information by the principal. Such fully
rational principal would just learn the firm’s type c1 = θ by observing and reimbursing the realized
first-period cost. For the second period, the principal would ask the operator to work at cost c∗2 = θ− e∗
and would just compensate the firm for incurring that first-best effort. This is clearly a naive strategy
for the firm because hiding information early on may induce the principal to increase subsidies at the
renegotiation stage and the operator can grasp some second-period rent by doing so.
If real-world practices were in lines with such strategy, one would observe mass points of obser-
vations for cost-plus contracts. This certainly contradicts our data set where no such mass points are
found. Moreover, assuming that regulators have limited rationality is fair given their poor expertise, as
described in Section 1.1.
Our modeling strategy of having an “almost” rational principal who updates his beliefs only with
the rough information revealed by the first-period choice C0i is therefore relevant. Our model keeps
then all the flavor of the dynamic rent/efficiency trade-off familiar from the theoretical literature on
renegotiation without rendering the analysis untractable due to our assumption of having a continuum
of types. It also makes the theoretical model as close as possible to the existing data set.
25Hart and Tirole (1988), Dewatripont (1989), and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 10), Bester and
Strausz (2001).
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The whole theoretical literature on renegotiation focuses on cases where the agent’s
type is drawn from distributions with discrete supports. Working in a model with a
continuum of types as we do here is necessary to take into account the significant
heterogeneity in the firm’s realized costs that is found in our data set. Our focus on a
continuum provides a nice division of the types space into three intervals ΘG, ΘI and
ΘB whose respective probabilities (obtained from the equilibrium behavior of cut-off
types that define those intervals) can be matched with the empirical distribution of
behaviors observed in our data.26
Renegotiation-proof profiles. Let us now characterize renegotiation-proof allocations.
Proposition 3 A first-period menu of contracts C = (b1, b2, b3) is renegotiation-proof if and
only if the following two conditions hold:
b3 ≥ βb1 + (1− β)b2, (4)
kf(b3 + k)−
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
F (b3 + k)− F
(
b1 + k +
1− β
β
(b2 − b3)
))
≤ 0. (5)
Condition (4) ensures that the interval ΘI is non-empty. It is just a feasibility con-
dition on the possible subsidies profiles that are relevant to generate the pattern of
histories found in our data set. Condition (5) expresses the fact that raising the second-
period subsidy for those firms which have revealed themselves as being of an inter-
mediate type by taking contract C02 is not attractive for the principal. The efficiency
gains (1 + λ)kf(b3 + k)db obtained when increasing the subsidy b3 by an amount db (so
that the marginal type θ∗2 who is just indifferent between taking the long-term cost-plus
contract and a fixed-price contract for the second period only moves up) should be less
than the net cost of raising the rent of all inframarginal who already chose C02 and enjoy
that increased subsidy. That cost is worth (1 + λ− α) (F (b3 + k)− F (θ∗1)) db.27
26Models with discrete types might allow a more detailed analysis of the pattern of information reve-
lation and are thus attractive from a theoretical point of view. However, such models are not consistent
with our data set. Indeed, mass points in the distribution of realized costs are not found in our data.
27Taken altogether, a constant subsidy profile b1 = b2 = b3 = bF and the cut-off rule θ∗1 = bF + k
never satisfy (5). The optimal long-term contract under full commitment and the corresponding pattern
of information revelation are not renegotiation-proof. Intuitively, upon learning that the firm is rather
inefficient following its earlier choice of producing under a cost-plus contract, the principal wants to
slightly raise the second-period subsidy to increase efficiency. Clearly, a firm with a type close to (but
below) θ∗1 = bF + k refuses the first-period subsidy because it gives little rent. It prefers to take a first-
period cost-plus contract and wait for the increase in the second-period subsidy which comes out of the
renegotiation towards a second-period fixed-price contract.
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Optimal renegotiation-proof menus of contracts. Optimizing the principal’s expected
intertemporal welfare subject to the renegotiation-proofness constraint (5), we find:
Proposition 4 The optimal renegotiation-proof menu of contracts CR = (bR1 , bR2 , bR3 ) entails
the following properties.
• The long-term fixed-price contract bR1 = bR2 = bR and the short-term fixed-price contract
for the second period only with bR3 = b¯R altogether satisfy
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
R
(
bR + k +
1− β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)
+
µ
β(1 + λ)
)
, (6)
k =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)F (b¯R + k)− F
(
bR + k + 1−β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)
f(b¯R + k)− f
(
bR + k + 1−β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)

−µ
((
1− α
1+λ
)(f(b¯R+k)
1−β +
f(bR+k+ 1−ββ (b
R−b¯R))
β
)
− kf ′(b¯R+k)
1−β
)
(1 + λ)
(
f(b¯R + k)− f
(
bR + k + 1−β
β
(bR − b¯R)
)) (7)
where µ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of (5).
• Subsidies are increasing
b¯R > bR. (8)
• The renegotiation-proofness constraint (5) holds as an equality
kf(b¯R + k) =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
F (b¯R + k)− F
(
bR + k +
1− β
β
(bR − b¯R)
))
. (9)
Our model of limited commitment predicts thus increasing profiles of subsidies in
the following sense: types who choose only a fixed-price contract for the second period
receive greater subsidies than those who choose fixed-price arrangements earlier on.
3 Empirical Model
We now turn to the empirical part of our analysis. Our objective is to assess the wel-
fare gains that could be obtained if parties to the contract could instead commit to
long-term contracts. To do so, we need to simulate an hypothetical situation of perfect
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commitment, conditional on the current ingredients of the regulation of the French
public transportation industry under limited commitment. These ingredients are un-
known to the econometrician and need to be estimated. We explain in this section how
we recover these ingredients and present the estimated values.
The estimation strategy is organized as a three-step procedure. We first focus on
the menus of contracts faced by the operators. As we only observe the subsidies paid
to the firms, we miss at least one item of the menu (bR, b
R
or both, depending on
which contractual arrangement is observed). The missing items need therefore to be
recovered. In a second step, we estimate the ingredients of the model which are specific
to the operator. Given the menu of contracts, the operator chooses the contract that
maximizes its payoff. We use information on the contract choice, on the observed and
estimated subsidies, as well as several characteristics of the operator obtained from our
database to identify the distribution of efficiency parameter θ and the social value of
effort k. Finally, we recover the missing ingredients related to the regulator. We focus
at this stage on the optimality conditions induced by Proposition 4.
Before turning to the empirical model itself, we present in the next section our data
and the different variables of interest. We will explain as well throughout each step of
the empirical analysis how we organize our dataset for the estimation. In particular,
we will define precisely which period and which network are selected in each case.
3.1 Data
Table 1 presents statistics on the different variables available in our data set. To un-
derstand how contracts are designed by public authorities and how operators choose
those contracts, we gather observations on subsidies. Such information is required to
recover the distribution of the efficiency parameter. Subsidies entail all payments to
the operator, either at the beginning of the production process which are needed to re-
imburse expected costs (in the case of fixed-price regimes), as well as payments to the
operator at the end of the contracting period to guarantee full reimbursement of total
operating costs (in the case of cost-plus contracts).
Recall that our theoretical model makes the accounting simplification that commer-
cial revenues are kept by the public authority and that costs are reimbursed to the
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operator. In our data, however, observed subsidies are the differences between ex-
pected or final costs and commercial revenues. To make our data coincide with the
model, we add commercial revenues to the observed subsidy. Finally, we distinguish
between nominal and real terms. Subsidies are deflated using consumer price indexes
(all items) for France. Only real subsidies are used during the estimation process.
The characteristics of the operators include the size of the network, the number of
lines operated, the size of the rolling stock, the share of the labor bill in total costs,
the share of drivers in the total labor force, and the identity of the industrial group
which owns the operator. We thus assume that some firms are more likely to perform
efficiently than others due to intrinsic advantages of larger stakes, size, managerial
practices and concentration of skills.
The size of the network is its total length measured in kilometers. The number of
lines operated in each network as well as the total size of the rolling stock measured
in the number of vehicles are also constructed. The share of the wage bill in total costs
is computed when dividing the wage bill by total costs. The total labor force includes
bus drivers as well as engineers who are keys to improve the operator’s productivity.
The share of engineers is simply obtained by dividing the number of engineers in each
network by the total labor force. Finally, the four important corporations who might
own the local operator are Keolis, Transdev, Agir, and Connex. We construct a dummy
variable for each of these corporations.
Institutional variables describing the public authority comprise the number of cities
involved in organizing the service, population size for the total urban area where the
service is provided, and the political color of the local regulator. As explained before,
the urban network may include several municipalities. We observe the number of cities
in each urban area as well as the total population of these areas. We also construct a
dummy variable that takes value one if the local government is right-wing, and zero
when it is left-wing. Data on the political color of the local government are published
by the French national newspaper Le Figaro. Over the period of investigation, local
governments may belong to one of the main political groups, ranked according to their
position on the political line from extreme right to extreme left (Extreme Right, Right,
Center Right, Left, and Extreme Left). We restrict the political landscape to two groups,
i.e., left-wing, and right-wing.
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Our raw dataset includes 49 networks observed over the 1987-2001 period. As each
contractual period lasts for 5 to 6 years, although there are some exceptions and some
missing data, we observe series of 3 contracts per network in most cases. Hence, our
initial database contains 136 contracts in total.
In order to make our dataset consistent with our (two-period) theoretical model,
we need to reduce slightly the size of the initial sample. We proceed as follows: If
a series of fixed-price regimes or a series of cost-plus regimes is considered, we keep
all the contractual periods under scrutiny for our empirical analysis, given that the
subsidies are constant from one period to another; hence, we may use series of three or
more contracts in this case. Now, when considering series where a fixed-price regime
is implemented after a cost-plus, we restrict our attention to contractual arrangements
which start after the arrival of a new local government. In this case, a cost-plus is
followed by one fixed-price or a series of fixed-price contracts. As a result, the reduced
sample which is considered for the estimation entails 117 contracts.
Note that one contract in one network should in principle correspond to a unique
observation in our empirical model, i.e., the contract items should remain constant
over the - say - 5 years of a contract length. The data reality may be slightly different.
In practice, the data set shows that over a single contract period, many items may
be affected by small fluctuations. This may for instance be the case of the operator’s
supply measured by the number of seat-kilometers available, which, in turns, makes
the costs and subsidy levels fluctuate too. These fluctuations follow from exogenous
shocks that may affect the activity of the operator over the contract length and are
assumed to be i.i.d. in our model: changes in traffic conditions, changes in network
configuration, road constructions which may cut a service route over a certain period,
and strikes are all such examples. The economic responses to these predictable shocks
are written in the contract. Hence, although some items may fluctuate over the contract
period, they pertain to the same contract. Instead of calculating a simple average value
of each item over the contractual period when fluctuations are present, we choose to
treat each contract-year as a separate observation so that the number of degrees of
freedom of our study is increased. This is why the number of observations (579) is
much larger in practice than the number of contracts.
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3.2 Step 1. Menus of contracts: Recovering Missing subsidies
A scenario with limited commitment corresponds to different observations with series
of fixed-price contracts, cost-plus contracts, or cost-plus contracts followed by fixed-
price contracts. The efficiency parameter θ of each operator, and therefore the subsidies
bR and b
R
of the proposed menu affect its choice of contract. A renegotiation-proof
scenario corresponds to the following possibilities.
• A series FF of fixed-price contracts over several contracting periods. The operator is
rather efficient (θ ≤ θ∗1 = bR + k + 1−ββ (bR − b
R
)).
• A cost-plus contract followed by a fixed-price contract (CF herein). The operator is
only mildly efficient (θ∗1 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗2 = b
R
+ k).
• A series of cost-plus contracts (CC herein). The operator is rather inefficient (θ ≥ θ∗2).
To exploit the two cut-offs θ∗1 and θ∗2 and recover the distribution of θ, we need to
observe the subsidies (bR and b
R
) specified in the optimal menu of contracts. Unfortu-
nately, our data do not allow us to observe all subsidies included into a renegotiation-
proof menu. Instead, only the actual subsidies paid to the operators are available.
Hence, if the contractual arrangement is respectively
• FF , we observe bFF directly in the data and we need to recover bFF ,
• CF , we observe bCF directly in the data and we need to recover bCF ,
• CC, we need to recover bCC .
Estimation. We propose to recover the missing variables b
FF
, bCF , and b
CC
empirically.
In each municipality i, we expect all these subsidies to depend on a set Y of charac-
teristics which pertain to the regulating authority, the operator, and the transportation
service itself. We write
bRi = B (Yi, τ) + ²i, (10)
bi
R
= B (Yi, υ) + κi, (11)
where ²i and κi are two error terms. The engineering relationships between the set of
variables Yi and each level of subsidy bi are identified through two distinct vectors of
parameters τ and υ, which have to be estimated. We thus expect to identify two distinct
marginal impacts of a given characteristic on the choice of bR and b
R
. According to
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our theoretical model, we need to check that bRi < bi
R
. We verify ex post, i.e., on our
estimates, that these inequalities hold.
The estimation procedure works as follows. (i) If we select in our dataset FF
arrangements only, the observed subsidies are the bRi . Using observations Y FFi related
to these specific arrangements, we obtain maximum likelihood estimates of τ . We then
derive the value b̂
CF
i using our estimates τ and a set of characteristics Y CFi if a CF
arrangement is instead considered. (ii) Likewise, if we select in our dataset the fixed-
price contracts of the CF arrangements only, the observed subsidies are the bi
R
. Using
observations Y CFi for these specific arrangements, we obtain maximum likelihood es-
timates of κ. We then derive the value b̂
FF
i (resp. b̂
CC
i ) using our estimates κ and a set
of characteristics Y FFi (resp. Y CCi ) if a FF (resp. CC) arrangement is considered.28
Data selection. From the reduced sample, selecting FF arrangements only yields a
subsample of 54 fixed-price contracts, i.e., 300 contract-years. Likewise, when keeping
the fixed-price contracts of the CF arrangements only, we obtain a subsample of 23
fixed-price contracts, i.e., 93 contract-years.
Results. We assume a linear relationship between a subsidy level and a set of char-
acteristics Yi in equations (10) and (11). The characteristics we focus on are related to
the regulator, the operator, or the network. These are the size of the rolling stock, the
size of the transport network, the share of the labor bill in total costs, a dummy vari-
able which takes value one if the local government is right-wing, and 0 otherwise, a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the operator belongs to the corporation Keolis
and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the operator belongs to the
corporation Agir and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the oper-
ator belongs to the corporation Connex and 0 otherwise. We also introduce operators
fixed effects given that several contract-years are observed for the same operator.
Results are presented in Table 2. Unsurprisingly, each subsidy level increases with
the volume of the rolling stock, or the network size. However, the network size is a
more important factor to explain the first-period subsidy bR, compared to b
R
, while
the second-period subsidy b
R
seems to be more sensitive to fluctuations in the rolling
stock. Subsidies decrease if the share of labor in total operating expenses increases.
28For ease of exposition, we omit the labels FF , CF , or CC in what follows.
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Likewise, the right-wing variable has a negative and significant sign;29 note that the
right/left margin is more pronounced when it comes to explaining b
R
compared to bR.
Moreover, our results suggest that the group that owns the operator matters as well.
Operators owned by Agir tend to receive lower subsidies compared to operators of
other groups. Likewise, operators owned by Keolis receive higher bR and lower b
R
.
In Table 3, we present the average value and the standard deviation of the estimated
b̂
R
and b̂
R
for all contract-year of the reduced sample. A simple t-test confirms that both
quantities are statistically different from each other. Moreover, b̂
R
< b̂
R
as expected.
3.3 Step 2. Contract choice
We recover now the distribution of types by matching the theoretical probabilities of
the three observed contractual regimes FF , CF and CC being chosen with their em-
pirical probabilities. To do so, we take a parametric approach and assume that the
distribution F (·, νlc, σlc) is normal with mean νlc, variance σlc and density f (·, νlc, σlc).30
Data selection. In order to compute the distribution of θ, we use all the contracts of
our reduced dataset since we are interested in the probabilities of choosing one series
of contracts among all the possible arrangements. We therefore consider 117 contracts,
i.e., 579 contract-years.
Estimation. We assume that the θis are independent draws from a normal distribution
that is common across networks. The operator accepts a fixed-price contract in both
periods when θi ≤ θ∗1i = bRi + k + 1−ββ (bRi − b̂
R
i ) so that the probability of accepting such
fixed-price contract is:
Pr (θi ≤ θ∗1i) = F
(
bRi + ki +
1− β
β
(bRi − b̂
R
i ), νlc, σlc
)
. (12)
29This outcome is ambiguous since it is difficult to disentangle the right-wing effect from other factors
which are proper to right-wing governments; in particular, right-wing municipalities have a significant
preference for fixed-price contracts and this may explain why subsidies are lower in this case.
30Our theoretical model assumes finite support for the distribution of innate costs. This is mainly to
avoid negative cost parameters. In our empirical analysis, those events have very low probabilities and
we simplify the analysis by using normal distributions. Note that using a normal distribution ensures
that our estimated distribution has short flat tails, i.e., a very small share of the operators lies in the
tails of the probability distribution. Using distributions on bounded intervals, such as the Beta or the
truncated normal, may be problematic. A Beta-distribution would impose a strong normalization on
costs, which is potentially damageable for the relevance of our structural model. At the same time,
identifying the additional parameters of a truncated normal is not feasible with our data.
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We consider here the pair
(
bRi , b̂
R
i
)
since the observed arrangement is FF . We allow
the unobserved social value of effort k to vary across networks; it depends on a set of
explanatory variables Xi which account for the characteristics of the operator:
ki = k (Xi, ϕ) , (13)
where ϕ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
The operator goes from a cost-plus to a fixed-price contract when θ∗1i ≤ θi ≤ θ∗2i =
b
R
i + ki. The probability of such pattern is thus:
Pr (θ∗1i ≤ θi ≤ θ∗2i) = F
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
− F
(
b̂
R
i + ki +
1− β
β
(̂b
R
i − b
R
i ), νlc, σlc
)
. (14)
We consider here the pair of subsidies
(
b̂
R
i , b
R
i
)
given a CF history.
Finally, the operator takes cost-plus contracts in both periods when θ∗2i = b̂
R
i + ki ≤
θi. The probability of accepting such arrangement is thus:
Pr (θ∗2i ≤ θi) = 1− F
(
b̂
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
. (15)
The log-likelihood of observing one specific contractual arrangement in network i over
period t can be written as:
Li (νlc, σlc) = ∆ilog
(
F
(
bRi + ki +
1− β
β
(bRi − b̂
R
i ), νlc, σlc
))
+
Πilog
(
F
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
− F
(
b̂Ri + ki +
1− β
β
(b̂Ri − b
R
i ), νlc, σlc
))
+Σilog
(
1− F
(
b̂
R
i + ki, νlc, σrp
))
,
where {∆i,Πi,Σi} are three dummies taking value one if the observed contractual
arrangement is of type {FF,CF,CC} respectively, and zero otherwise.
Observations being independent, the log-likelihood for our sample is just the sum
of all individual log-likelihood functions:
L (µlc, σlc) =
N∑
i=1
Li (νrp, σlc) .
Results. To estimate F (·), we need to determine which variables X affect the social
value of effort k. Explanatory variables are related to the operator’s characteristics
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(its skills and managerial ability, its effort technology). These variables are a constant,
the total size of the service network in kilometers, the number of lines operated, the
size of the rolling stock in number of vehicles, the share of the labor bill in total costs,
the percentage of engineers in the total labor force, a dummy variable worth 1 if the
operator belongs to the corporation Keolis and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable worth 1
if the operator belongs to the corporation Agir and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable
worth 1 if the operator belongs to the corporation Connex and 0 otherwise.
Results are presented in Table 4. During the estimation, we realized that explana-
tions for the social value of effort highly differ from one network to the other, i.e., we
could not obtain unique significant effects for all operators. Hence, we allow estima-
tion results to vary from one group to another. We present three different estimations.
In (I), k depends on four dummy variables which account for the identity of the
operator’s group (Connex is the reference group). Only Trandev has a significant and
positive effect on k, suggesting that an operator belonging to Transdev may guarantee
a higher social return on effort compared to operators from other groups.31
In (II), the explanatory variables are a constant for each group and the size of the
network interacted with each one of the group dummy variables. The results show
that the size of the network significantly and positively affects the social value of effort
in networks where Agir operates. This may illustrate that economies of scale in effort
technology are greater for larger networks.
In (III), the explanatory variables are a constant for each group and the share of
engineers interacted with each one of the group dummy variables. The share of engi-
neers provides a measure for the endowment of skills embodied in the firm. Engineers
are generally responsible for research and development, quality control, maintenance,
and efficiency. Their action is particularly important to improve the average speed of
the network. We expect thus the share of engineers in the total labor force to positively
affect the social value of effort. Instead, the results suggest ambiguous effects. If the
operator belongs to Transdev, the share of engineers has the expected effect. If the
operator belongs to Agir or Keolis, the effect goes in the opposite direction.
31The social value of effort is negatively related to the technological cost of effort, which implies that
Transdev also enjoys a less costly effort technology. It would be interesting to relate these findings to the
internal structure of managerial incentives in that firm but we did not have access to such information.
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Other variables such as the number of lines operated, the size of the rolling stock, or
the share of the labor bill in total costs have not given significant results. The three es-
timation procedures yield very similar estimates of νlc and σlc, the mean and standard
deviation of θ’s normal distribution respectively. Our results are strongly significant
and suggest that the average innate cost θ varies between 14 and 15 millions Euros.
We also obtain a direct estimate of the intertemporal weight β. Values are between
0.25 and 0.41, indicating that the second period is perceived as more important.
Finally, it is of interest to test whether our structural model for contract selection is
useful and appropriate. To do so, we test our model against a simple ordered probit
specification where the three contractual arrangements are chosen with probabilities
Pr (FF ) = Φ (−δX), Pr (CF ) = Φ (µ− δX)− Φ (−δX), and Pr (CC) = 1− Φ (µ− δX);
δ being a vector of parameters to be estimated together with µ, X being the set of
the operator’s characteristics described above, and Φ (.) being the c.d.f. of the normal
distribution. Since the two models are non-nested, we use a test proposed by Vuong
(1989). The null hypothesis is that both models are equally far from the true data
generating process in terms of Kullback-Liebler distances. The alternative hypothesis
is that one of the two models is closer to the true data generating process. When the
Vuong statistics is less than 2 in absolute value, the test does not favor one model
against the other. Here, the statistics of our structural model versus the ordered probit
is 4.7. This strongly supports the structural approach presented in this paper.
3.4 Step 3. Political preferences
Once estimates ν̂lc, σ̂lc, β̂ and k̂i are obtained, we evaluate the regulator’s preference
parameter α̂i. To do so, we use the renegotiation-proofness condition (9) which is now
rewritten as:
−ki f
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
+
(
1− αi
1 + λ
)(
F
(
b
R
i + ki, νlc, σlc
)
− F
(
bRi + ki +
1− β
β
(
bRi − b
R
i
)
, νlc, σlc
))
= 0, i = 1, .., N.
(16)
The weight αi varies across cities. It depends on a set of explanatory variables Zi
which characterize the local authority:
αi = α (Zi, χ) , (17)
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where χ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
Note that we cannot identify separately the weight α and the cost of public funds λ
since only the ratio α
1+λ
matters in Equation (9). We will thus let λ take several values
which are consistent with the cost of an administration operating in a developed coun-
try.32 We only present estimation results when λ = 0.3. Alternative estimates of α can
easily be calculated when λ 6= 0.3.
Data selection. We restrict the reduced sample to fixed-price contracts only given that
Proposition 4 is about short-term (the fixed-price contracts belong to a CF arrange-
ment) and long-term (the fixed-price contracts belong to a FF arrangement) fixed-price
regimes. This yields a subsample of 77 contracts, i.e., 393 contract-years.
Estimation. To obtain maximum likelihood estimates, Equation (16) is rewritten as
J
(
bR, b
R
, ki, αi, λ, νrp, σlc, ξi
)
= 0, (18)
where ξi is an error term. We need again do distinguish between the observed and
the estimated
(
bR, b
R
)
. If the observed fixed-price contract is extracted from a CF
arrangement, we consider the pair
(
b̂
R
i , b
R
i
)
. Otherwise, If the observed fixed-price
contract belongs to a FF arrangement, we consider the pair
(
bRi , b̂
R
i
)
.
Results. The explanatory variables which enter Zi are a constant, the number of cities
within the local authority in charge of the service, the size of the population of the rel-
evant urban area, and the local political color.33 With the first two variables, we want
to test whether the size of the city or a greater division of the network into distinct ur-
ban areas affects the bargaining power of the operator. We expect the latter to be more
important in small networks or networks made of many urban areas. With respect to
the political color of the local government, casual evidence suggests that a right-wing
local government is more eager to provide favors to private operators. The estimate α̂i
should thus be higher with a right-wing local government.34
32For instance, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) provided estimates (namely, 1.17 to 1.56) of the
welfare loss due to a one-percent increase in all distortionary tax rates (see also Hausman and Poterba
(1987) on this). In the case of Canadian commodity taxes, Campbell (1975) found that this distortion is
equal to 1.24. More generally, it seems that the distortion falls between 1.15 and 1.40 in countries with
an efficient tax collection system. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) obtained a similar result in their study of
the French transportation sector.
33When the local authority includes several cities, the political color is that of the main municipality.
34This point is corroborated in Levin and Tadelis (2009).
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Results are presented in Table 5. First, the number of cities constituting the local
authority and population size were not significant and have been discarded. Second,
whether the government is right-wing or not has a positive and very significant impact
on α, confirming thereby our prior intuition. In this case, α takes value 0 for left-wing
local governments while it is strictly positive for the right-wing ones. Third, our initial
restriction α ≤ 1 + λ holds, even though it is not imposed in the estimation.
A potential criticism of our three-step estimation procedure is that we may not fully
account for the optimality constraints of Proposition 4 in the sense that (6) and (7) are
not part of the estimation process. An alternative estimation procedure could consist in
recovering values of
(
bR, b
R
)
through the system (6), (7) and (9). Thus, bR (.) and b
R
(.)
would be two functions of a set of variables and parameters to be estimated which we
could use to write the log-likelihood of observing one specific contractual arrangement
in a similar fashion as in Step 2. This alternative procedure has the attractive feature of
accounting explicitly for the optimality conditions for the regulator’s problem. How-
ever, it suffers from a serious drawback in that it does not use our data observations
of
(
bR, b
R
)
. We argue that this alternative procedure and our methodology are similar,
conditional on the fact that our theoretical model perfectly explains the data reality. Ex-
pecting that our model provides a perfect fit is probably excessive. We therefore prefer
to use the data information on
(
bR, b
R
)
. To convince the reader that our approach is
reasonable, we propose an ex-post test to check that our estimates ν̂lc, σ̂lc, β̂, k̂i, and
α̂i verify the conditions expressed in (6) and (7). To do so, we replace µ in (6) by its
expression from (7) in order to generate an equation (6’). Then, we compute a t-test
to check whether the left-hand side of equation (6’) is significantly different from its
right-hand side. We cannot reject the hypothesis that both sides are equal.
4 The Welfare Gains of Commitment
We assess now the magnitude of the welfare gains which can be obtained once one
moves from the renegotiation-proof setting to the less constrained full commitment
scenario. We also investigate how these gains are distributed between private opera-
tors and taxpayers. This is an important issue for practitioners since they often have
complained about the insufficient length of concession contracts in this sector.
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Starting from our estimates of the various parameters of the model obtained from
the renegotiation-proof scenario, we can reconstruct estimates of the average social
cost of subsidies and the average rent left to operators under full commitment.35 We
proceed as follows.36
Data selection. We restrict the reduced sample to FF arrangements only given that
proposition 1 is about long-term fixed-price contracts. Moreover, we focus on right-
wing networks only since we need α̂R > 0. Once outliers are discarded, we obtain a
subsample of 114 contract-years.
Step 1. Using our set of renegotiation-proof estimates ΥR =
(
ν̂R, σ̂R, k̂R, α̂R, β̂R
)
con-
ditional on λ and its expression from the maximand in a scenario with limited com-
mitment, we compute expected welfare levels WRi for each network of our subsample.
As emphasized throughout this section, the renegotiation-proof scenario corresponds
to the actual contractual practices encountered in the French urban transport industry.
Hence, the estimatesΥR give to the econometrician some information on the operator’s
and public authority’s true characteristics.
Step 2. We simulate the hypothetical subsidy level b̂Fi that would be paid under full
commitment. To do so, we solve (1) with respect to b̂Fi , using the real networks charac-
teristics ΥR.
Step 3. We reconstruct the hypothetical welfare measures WˆFi for each network of our
subsample, as predicted under full commitment, and using estimates b̂Fi and ΥR.
We compute the total welfare gains as well as the gains for taxpayers and oper-
ators from commitment by considering an average network of the subsample, using
estimates ΥR conditional on λ = 0.3 and ki specified as in (II) in Table 4.37
The estimates reported in Table 6 shed light on several interesting results. Of course,
commitment always improves welfare compared to the situation where renegotiation
puts further constraints on contracting. The important question is actually to deter-
mine how welfare gains of commitment are distributed between the parties. It turns
out that T̂ Fi > T̂Ri , i.e., switching from limited to full commitment entails a higher in-
35Remember that our theoretical model has normalized the value of the service at some fixed level
S so that consumers’ gross surplus does not change when considering different regimes. This variable
will thus be omitted in our analysis.
36See the Appendix for details.
37Note that the final welfare results do not vary in a significant manner if other values of ki are chosen.
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tertemporal subsidy. The intertemporal payment to the operator increases, on average,
by 6.1 million Euros. Hence, taxpayers lose from an increase in the length of concession
contracts, given that social costs increase by 8 million Euros (+22.4%) on average.
Turning now to operators, our estimates show that their intertemporal rent in-
creases when moving to full commitment by 8.2 million Euros (+11.5%). This is a
significant gain that explains why operators are pushing to increase contracts length.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a principal-agent model under limited commitment that features
the main characteristics of contracts and institutional practices in the French urban
transportation sector. On top of estimating key parameters of the economic and polit-
ical landscape in this sector, this model has allowed us to evaluate the cost of renego-
tiation and how welfare gains would be redistributed by increasing contract duration
and improving commitment. The welfare gains from extending contract length are
significant but mostly accrue to operators.
In this conclusion, we would like to make a few remarks on our approach and
suggest alleys for further investigation.
First, our result on the significant welfare gains of extending contract length should
be taken with some words of caution. Indeed, it starts from the premise that, in this
sector, competition is almost absent at the bidding stage. We are thus examining the
benefits of such reform in a monopolistic setting where more competition could even
bring higher welfare gains. However, one can also argue that extending contract length
would not favor the emergence of a more competitive playing field which may have a
negative impact on long-run welfare.
By focusing on menus with only two items (fixed-price and cost-plus contracts)
whereas a model with a continuum of types would invite more complex menus and
by simplifying the procedure for updating beliefs, we have significantly simplified our
theoretical model. The benefit is that we were able to bring the lessons of the rene-
gotiation literature to the data. Computing the optimal renegotiation-proof contract
with a continuum of types (already a first-magnitude challenge) and then estimating it
econometrically would be a painful project. Taking data and institutional constraints
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seriously forced us instead to focus on the case of simple menus which, although sub-
optimal, brings also some tractability. This procedure seems to us extremely promising
in areas where a purely theoretical approach would either produce untractable models
or make progresses at the cost of imposing heroic assumptions on the underlying type
distribution (assuming typically discrete types), assumptions that might hardly be cor-
roborated by data. Our “midway” approach could certainly be fruitful also for other
industries and contractual environments.
Even though our estimates show that welfare gains of commitment are significant,
we might be underestimating those gains. Indeed, we have no ideas on how renegoti-
ation weakens the operator’s incentives to make any relationship-specific investment
in this sector except through informal talks with practitioners in the field. Introduc-
ing these considerations would reinforce our argument in favor of extending contract
length. This would indeed help to secure specific investments and avoid hold-ups.
On the other hand, one could also argue that even writing a long-term contract
may entail significant transaction costs, especially when future contingencies cannot be
perfectly foreseen ex ante. In our model, such transaction costs have deliberately been
omitted since we focused on stationary environments where efficiency parameters are
drawn once for all. Introducing the possibility of writing more flexible contracts as
uncertainty gets resolved would unveil some interesting benefits of renegotiation. On
top, the need for drafting flexible arrangements may also favor fixed-price contracts
since those contracts make operators more reactive to shocks affecting their costs. Yet,
it is unclear to us whether those theoretical arguments in favor of some kind of limited
commitment matter in the transportation sector under scrutiny.
A more complete analysis of the renegotiation process should incorporate the pos-
sibility that public authorities build reputations for being tough at the renegotiation
stage to avoid thereby giving larger subsidies to operators. Such reputations might
potentially relax significantly renegotiation-proofness constraints. In other words, an
omitted variable of our analysis is the amount of reputational capital available to the
contracting parties involved in those repeated negotiations. Our theoretical model has
put aside reputation issues and has thus analyzed a “worst scenario” under renegotia-
tion. More research both on the theory side and also in building data sets which could
account for that reputational capital is certainly called for.
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Our estimation has highlighted a few systematic differences between operators of
different companies in their abilities to generate social value through managerial ef-
forts. It would be worth linking those different abilities to the internal organizations,
the management practices and incentive structures of those firms. But again, we have
no information on this issue at this stage.
Lastly, our estimate of the cost distribution allows us to ascertain whether the re-
striction to simple menus matters even in a static context. Echoing the theoretical
works of Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007), we could indeed ask whether
simple two-item menus fare well compared with more complex menus given our esti-
mate of the types distribution. Such investigation would help us to unveil whether the
major sources of benefits in contract design come either from extending contract length
or from better designing cost reimbursement rules in any given period. This last issue
is high on practitioners’ agenda.
We hope to investigate some of those issues in future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The principal’s intertemporal welfare under full commitment
can be expressed as:
W F (b1, b2) = S−(1+λ)
(
(βb1 + (1− β)b2)F (βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k) +
∫ θ¯
βb1+(1−β)b2+k
θf(θ)dθ
)
+α
∫ βb1+(1−β)b2+k
θ
(βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k − θ)f(θ)dθ.
The term (βb1+(1−β)b2)F (βb1+(1−β)b2+k) represents the expected subsidy under a
long-term fixed-price contract knowing that only a mass of those types worth F (βb1 +
(1− β)b2 + k) is ready to accept such contract. The term
∫ θ¯
βb1+(1−β)b2+k θf(θ)dθ is meant
for the expected payment under a cost-plus contract. Finally, the last term represents
the expected information rent which is left only to the most efficient firms under the
fixed-price contract.
The principal’s problem can be rewritten as:
(PF ) : max
(b1,b2)
W F (b1, b2)
The monotone hazard rate property ensures quasi-concavity of this objective.38 The
corresponding first-order conditions characterize the optimal subsidy in (1).
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix any initial contract C0 and consider a renegotiated offer
R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that satisfies (2). Given the agent’s conjectures about the renegotiated sub-
sidies R = (b2, b3) (which are correct at equilibrium), the principal’s expected welfare
at date 2 can be written as:
W2(C
0, R˜, R) =
∫ b1+k+ 1−ββ (b2−b3)
θ
(
S − (1 + λ)b˜2 + α(b˜2 + k − θ)
)
f(θ)dθ (19)
+
∫ b˜3+k
b1+k+
1−β
β
(b2−b3)
(
S − (1 + λ)b˜3 + α(b˜3 + k − θ)
)
f(θ)dθ (20)
+
∫ θ¯
b˜3+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)dθ. (21)
This expression takes into account that operators with types in [θ, b1 + k+ 1−ββ (b2− b3)]
are already committed to a long-term fixed price contract anticipating the equilibrium
38See for instance Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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subsidies for the second period. They nevertheless welcome any principal’s deviation
that increases the second-period subsidy b˜2 above b2 at the renegotiation stage and the
principal’s payoff from such deviation must be computed with this new subsidy. This
gives us a contribution to expected second period welfare equal to the first-term in (19).
Operators with types in [b1+k+ 1−ββ (b2− b3), b3+k] are committed to operate under
a fixed-price contract only in the second period. But increasing this subsidy from b3 to
b˜3 attracts some even less efficient operators who are now willing to operate under a
fixed-price contract whereas the most inefficient types in [b˜3 + k, θ¯] remain on a cost-
plus. This yields the expressions of the last two terms (20) and (21).
At date 1.25, the principal looks for a menu that maximizes the second-period
welfare W2(C0, R˜, R) subject to the acceptance condition (2). The renegotiated offers
R = (b2, b3) must solve the following problem:
(R0) : R = argmax
R˜
W2(C
0, R˜, R) subject to (2).
Take any initial contract offer C0 = (b1, R0) and define R as the solution to (R0).
Consider now the new contract C = (b1, R). We want to prove that the history of the
firm’s types self-selection and the principal’s second-period payoff are both unchanged
with this new offer. Several observations lead to that result.
1. Since the agent’s perfectly anticipates the issue of renegotiation and makes his
first-period accordingly, self-selection among the three different options takes
place exactly in the same way with C as when C0 is initially offered.
2. By definition, any offer R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that is feasible at the renegotiation-stage given
R is feasible given R0. Indeed, that b2 satisfies the first condition in (2) and b˜2
satisfies the first condition in (3) implies
b˜2 ≥ b02. (22)
Similarly, that b3 satisfies the second condition in (2) and b˜3 satisfies the second
condition in (3) altogether imply
b˜3 ≥ b03. (23)
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3. By definition, R solves (R0) and thus for any R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that is feasible given R0,
we have:
W2((b
0
1, R), R,R) ≥ W2((b01, R), R˜, R). (24)
This condition is true, in particular, for any R˜ = (b˜2, b˜3) that is feasible at the
renegotiation-stage following the offer of R. This shows that R comes unchanged
through the renegotiation process, i.e., solves the following problem:
(R) : R = argmax
R˜
W2((b1, R), R˜, R) subject to (3).
This ends the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Define the principal’s intertemporal welfare when offering
C = (b1, b2, b3) as:
W(C) =
∫ b1+k+ 1−ββ (b2−b3)
θ
(S − (1 + λ)(βb1 + (1− β)b2) + α(βb1 + (1− β)b2 + k − θ)) f(θ)dθ
+
∫ b3+k
b1+k+
1−β
β
(b2−b3)
(S − (1 + λ)(βθ + (1− β)b3) + α(1− β)(b3 + k − θ)) f(θ)dθ
+
∫ θ¯
b3+k
(S − (1 + λ)θ) f(θ)dθ.
The optimal renegotiation-proof menu solves the following optimization problem:
(PR) : max
C
W(C) subject to (4) and (5).
We shall assume quasi-concavity in (b1, b2, b3) of the corresponding Lagrangean. The
solution CR = (bR1 , bR2 , bR3 ) to problem (PR) is then straightforward.
First, note that α < 1 + λ implies that the maximum of the first integral in (21) is
obtained when (3) is binding.
Second, consider (unexpected) renegotiation offers with b˜3 ≥ b3. Types in [b3 +
k, b˜3 + k] which were expecting to work on a second-period cost-plus contract are now
adopting the fixed-price contract with the new greater subsidy b˜3 at the renegotiation
stage. Optimizing (R) which is quasi-concave in b˜3 and taking into account that b3
must be the solution yields condition (5).
Proof of Proposition 4. Assuming quasi-concavity in (b1, b2, b3) of the Lagrangean cor-
responding to the optimization problem, the first-order optimality conditions for bR1
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and bR2 are the same so that, it is optimal to set bR1 = bR2 = b
R. Taking into this fact and
optimizing with respect to (bR, b¯R) yields the first-order conditions (6) and (7).
Moreover, (5) implies that
F (b¯R + k)− F
(
bR + k +
(1− β)
β
(bR − b¯R)
)
> 0
which itself implies bR < b¯R.
Welfare Estimates. Using our estimates from the case where renegotiation-proof con-
tracts are considered, we get the following expression of welfare in network i:
WRi = S − (1 + λ)TRi + α̂Ri URi , (25)
where
TRi =
∫ bRi +k̂Ri + 1−β̂β̂ (bRi −bRi )
θ
bRi f(θ)dθ +
∫ bRi +k̂Ri
bRi +k̂
R
i +
1−β̂
β̂
(bRi −b
R
i )
(β̂θ + (1− β̂)bRi )f(θ)dθ
+
∫ θ¯
b
R
i +k̂
R
i
θf(θ)dθ,
and
URi =
∫ bRi +k̂Ri + 1−β̂β̂ (bRi −bRi )
θ
(
bRi + k̂
R
i − θ
)
f(θ)dθ+
∫ bRi +k̂Ri
bRi +k̂
R
i +
1−β̂
β̂
(bRi −b
R
i )
(1− β) (bRi +k̂Ri −θ)f(θ)dθ.
Likewise, from our full commitment program, we define welfare as the weighted
sum of surplus S, expected taxes T Fi and operator’s expected rent UFi weighted by the
corresponding weight α̂Ri :
WFi = S − (1 + λ)T Fi + α̂Ri UFi , (26)
where
T Fi = b̂
F
i F
(
b̂Fi + k̂
R
i
)
+
∫ θ¯
b̂Fi +k̂
R
i
θf(θ)dθ,
and
UFi =
∫ b̂Fi +k̂Ri
θ
(̂bFi + k̂
R
i − θ)f(θ)dθ.
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Note that the gross surplus S vanishes when one computes the difference between
both welfare measures WRi and WFi . Hence, we evaluate the welfare differential be-
tween both renegotiation-proof and perfect commitment situations as
∆Wi =WFi −WRi . (27)
Similar definitions follow for ∆Ti and ∆Ui.
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Variables Mean Stand. Dev.
Nominal Subsidy (Euros) 20,702,141 19,239,199
Including Revenue (Euros) 9,608,629 10,526,903
Subsidy per unit of supply (Euro) 0.016 0.005
Real Subsidy (Euros) 18,760,150 17.395,482
Size of the network (km) 288.3 200.1
# of lines 23.6 13.2
# of vehicles 168.1 119.5
# of cities in the urban network 18.3 16.7
Size of population 236,799 177,641
Share of Labor in total costs 0.64 0.10
Share of engineers 0.29
Share right-wing government 0.52
Share Fixed Price contracts 0.55
Share Keolis 0.32
Share Agir 0.16
Share Connex 0.22
Share Transdev 0.24
Table 1: Data
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b b
Variables I II I II
Constant 6.17∗∗∗ 6.39∗∗∗ 7.15∗∗∗ 7.49∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33)
Rolling Stock 0.54∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Network Size 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.07∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Right-Wing -0.06∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Labor Share -1.11∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Connex 0.07 -0.15
(1.15) (3.02)
Agir -0.7∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07)
Keolis 0.8∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06)
Error Sd. Dev. 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Firms Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Observations 300 300 93 93
Table 2: Estimated Subsidies I
b̂ b̂
Average (1000 Euros) 13487∗∗ 16490∗∗
(6436) (7249)
# of Observations 579 579
Table 3: Estimated Subsidies II
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Social value of effort k
Variables I II III
Agir -0.05 -1.05∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.41) (0.25)
Keolis 0.06 -0.03 0.29∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.11)
Transdev 0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗ -0.94∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.19) (0.37)
Agir×size 4.08∗∗∗
(1.58)
Keolis×size 0.46
(0.39)
Transdev×size 1.17
(0.78)
Agir×Engineers -3.80∗∗∗
(0.92)
Keolis×Engineers -0.89∗∗
(0.39)
Transdev×Engineers 5.01∗∗∗
(1.57)
First Period Weight β 0.39∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Mean θ (×10000) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Stand. Dev. θ (×10000) 0.29∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04)
# of Observations 579
Table 4: Renegotiation-proof: Inefficiency distribution and social value of effort
α×right wing
λ I II III
0.3 1.20∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
# of Observations 392
Table 5: Renegotiation-proof: Parameters of interest in Proposition 2
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Welfare Items Total (in Million Euros)
Subsidy
- Full commitment 33.6
- Renegotiation-proof 27.5
Differential +6.1
Social cost
- Renegotiation-proof 35.7
- Full commitment 43.7
Differential +8.0
Rent operator
- Renegotiation-proof 71.3
- Full commitment 79.5
Differential +8.2
Total welfare
- Renegotiation-proof 50.9
- Full commitment 53.0
Differential +2.1
# of observations 114
Table 6: Welfare differentials for the average network
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